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A question that receives considerable attention in the theoretical as well as empirical 
corporate finance literature is why companies issue convertible debt. While practitioners 
put forward notions such as delayed equity, lower coupon rate and “sweetening” of deals 
that are otherwise hard to sell1, academics have proposed theories that relate the use of 
convertible debt to informational asymmetries (Brennan and Kraus, 1987, Brennan and 
Schwartz, 1988, Kim, 1990, and Stein, 1992), agency issues (Green, 1984, Mayers, 1998, 
and Isagawa, 2000) and tax motives (Jalan and Barone-Adesi, 1995). These theories in 
general suggest that companies that face high debt- and/or equity-related agency costs 
could benefit from issuing convertible debt as opposed to other “straight” means of 
financing. Prime candidates for issuing convertible debt are companies for which 
straight debt or equity do not provide the most efficient way of financing. These include 
companies to which one of the following problems applies: difficulty in estimating risk, 
possession of ample growth opportunities, high costs of financial distress, financial 
constrains, and/or high agency costs. 
 
A convertible bond, from now on to be referred to as a convertible, is a bond that can be 
exchanged for a predetermined fixed number of “new” shares of the issuing company 
within a predetermined period of time. In essence, a convertible is a package consisting 
of a straight bond and warrants written on the issuing company stock.2 Empirically it is 
well documented that different security types induce different wealth effects at the time 
of their announcements. For example, seasoned equity offerings induce the strongest 
negative wealth effects (see, e.g., Masulis and Korwar, 1986, Mikkelson and Partch, 
1986, and Asquith and Mullins, 1986) of between -2.5 and -4.5 percent, while straight 
debt issues induce only slightly (many times insignificant) negative wealth effects (see, 
e.g., Dann and Mikkelson, 1984, and Eckbo, 1986). Given the hybrid character of 
convertibles, we can expect that the size of the wealth effects associated with the 
                                                 
 See, for example, surveys of managers by: 1
 Billingsley and Smith (1996) (for the U.S. market) 
 Graham and Harvey (2001) (for the U.S. market) 
 Bancel and Mittoo (2004) (for the European markets). 
2 Given that the exercise price is “paid” by redeeming the bonds, convertible bonds are in fact warrants with a 
variable exercise price. 
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announcements of convertible security offerings will be between those for straight debt 
and equity. 
 
Previous studies on stock market reactions to the announcements of convertible debt 
issues in the U.S. market document significant negative effects of convertible debt 
announcements in the range between -1 to -3 percent.3 Other studies on Anglo-Saxon 
markets find similar results, that is, Magennis, Watts and Wright (1998) and Abhyankar 
and Dunning (1999) find significantly negative effects for the Australian and the UK 
markets respectively. Outside the Anglo-Saxon markets, the empirical evidence has been 
somewhat less conclusive. Burlacu (2000), Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2005a), 
Ammann, Fehr and Seiz (2006) find similar effects for France, Western European 
markets, and Germany and Switzerland respectively. However, results for other markets 
go in the opposite direction. More specifically, Kang and Stulz (1996), and Christensen, 
Faria, Kwok, and Bremer (1996) find positive effects for the Japanese market; Chang, 
Chen, and Liu (2004) find positive (insignificant) effects for the Taiwanese market; and 
De Roon and Veld (1998) find a significantly positive effect for the Dutch market. The 
hybrid nature of convertibles and the institutional and regulatory differences among 
countries and markets seem to be the driving force of the divergence. This makes the 
analysis one of the more interesting fields in empirical corporate finance today, since 
convertible debt can be structured to be either more debt- or equity-like as to mitigate 
some of the risks and deficiencies associated with each of “plain” securities. 
 
Following Burlacu (2000), Lewis et al. (2003) and Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2005a), 
we estimate the structure of the convertible debt design (i.e. how debt- or equity-like it 
is) by employing the delta measure. The delta measure relates the price sensitivity of a 
convertible to the underlying equity, and takes values between 0 and 1. A value closer to 
1 suggests that the convertible is more equity-like, since the probability of conversion is 
higher. As an alternative measure of the convertible debt design we use equity-to-debt 
component ratio, where equity and debt components are estimated using the valuation 
approach proposed by Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998). Note that issuers of convertibles 
that are more equity-like are supposed to be more adversely affected by equity-related 
costs, while debt-like issuers are more negatively affected by debt-related costs. 
                                                 
3 These studies include Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Lewis, Rogalski and Seward 
(1999, 2003), and Arshanapalli, Fabozzi, Switzer, and Gosselin (2004). See Table 12.4 of Loncarski, ter Horst 




According to adverse selection models on capital structure (e.g. Myers and Majluf, 1984), 
we expect that more debt-like offerings are associated with less negative abnormal 
returns and more equity-like offerings with more negative abnormal returns. Moreover, 
we do not expect more debt-like convertible offerings to be significantly affected by 
equity-related agency costs and more equity-like convertible offerings by debt-related 
agency costs. 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first objective is to provide further evidence on 
the market reactions to convertible debt offerings. The second objective is to examine the 
nature and determinants of the size of the wealth effect with respect to issuer 
characteristics and relate the findings to theories about motives for the use of convertible 
debt. We examine the influence of several issuer characteristics on announcement 
reactions in the Canadian market in the period between 1991 and 2004. This study is 
related to previous, mainly U.S. based research, since the Canadian market shares many 
of its design features with its U.S. counterpart and adds to the literature on the use of 
convertible debt. To our knowledge this is the first study that examines the wealth 
effects associated with convertible debt issues in the Canadian market. 
 
Our empirical findings are mostly in line with the seminal work of Myers and Majluf 
(1984) on external financing and the role of informational asymmetry. As in the U.S., the 
event study analysis shows that wealth effects associated with the announcements of 
Canadian convertibles offerings yield significantly negative abnormal returns of around 
-2.7%. The analysis shows that this is to be attributed to the more equity-like nature of 
most of the convertibles issued in the Canadian market in the period under 
consideration, in particular before 2000.  
 
With respect to the firm-specific determinants of announcement price reactions, we find 
that the abnormal returns are driven by factors related to both the debt- and equity-like 
features of convertible debt: interest coverage, which affects debt-related costs, and stock 
price run-up (overvaluation issue), which drives equity-related costs. Firms that pay 
dividends are consistently found to have higher cumulative average abnormal returns 
related to the announcement of the convertible offerings, as the dividend payout serves 
as a disciplining device that lowers equity-related agency costs. These results appear to 
be robust across different specifications, i.e. when we control for the stated use of the 
proceeds (acquisitions, capital expenditures or refinancing). These findings are in line 
3 
 
with the theories that relate the use of convertible debt to mitigate different aspects of 
informational asymmetries. We do not find support for tax arguments for the use of 
convertible debt. With respect to the control variables, our results indicate that firm size 
in some cases negatively affects the abnormal market response at the time of a 
convertible debt announcement. This is somewhat surprising to the extent that both 
debt- and equity-related costs are expected to be reduced for larger firms, but could also 
be viewed from the perspective that opaqueness increases with the size of a firm.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the 
theoretical models yielding the testable hypotheses for our study. Section 3 describes the 
sample, provides some summary statistics, and discusses the methodology. In Section 4 
we present the empirical results on the announcement returns and their determinants. 
Section 5 gives the conclusion. 
2. SHAREHOLDER REACTIONS TO CONVERTIBLE DEBT ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
2.1. Wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible debt 
offerings 
 
A general explanation of why investors react negatively to security offerings follows from 
the informational asymmetry between managers and the market with respect to value of 
assets in place and/or future growth opportunities. In this respect, security offerings are 
viewed as special examples of the lemons problem presented by Akerlof (1970). The 
models of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985) can be viewed as specific 
applications of the lemons problem. According to these models, when a company issues 
risky securities, investors will demand a discount on the security price in order to be 
compensated for a potential overvaluation of the firm. Therefore, the announcements of 
convertible issues are predicted to have a negative impact on the issuer’s stock price. 
 
From the results of previous studies it appears that the abnormal returns may be driven 
by the type of the financial system. Market-oriented systems, including those in the U.S., 
Canada and the U.K. have well-developed financial markets and open corporations with 
widely dispersed share ownership. On the other hand, network-oriented systems, 
including those in Japan, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands have strong banks 
with large share ownership and a greater role in monitoring. In the market-based 
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systems it is expected that managers are more likely to act in the interest of existing 
shareholders, and informational asymmetries may be larger. It follows from Myers and 
Majluf's (1984) adverse selection model that in these systems the market reaction to 
convertible debt issues may be less favourable. In the network-oriented systems, where 
managers are more likely to be entrenched given their institutional settings, the Myers 
and Majluf model may not hold.  
 
A second explanation for negative stock returns at the announcement of convertible debt 
issues attributes these returns at least in part to systematic underpricing of public 
offerings. If public offerings are underpriced, then wealth is transferred from the firm’s 
current stockholders to the purchasers of the underpriced securities. Evidence of 
underpricing for convertibles at the issue date is reported by Kang and Lee (1996) and 
Chan and Chen (2005) for example. 
 
Given the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984), the possibility of 
underpricing and the nature of the convertibles (hybrid securities) we test the following 
hypothesis regarding the wealth effects associated with the announcements of 
convertible debt offerings. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The announcement of convertible bond offerings by companies 
in Canada has a significant negative market valuation effect. 
 
2.2. Determinants of the size of wealth effects 
 
In general the following characteristics determine market response to convertible debt 
offering: 
 issue characteristics (see, e.g. Magennis et al., 1998, Burlacu, 2000, and Dutordoir 
and Van de Gucht, 2005a); 
 issuer characteristics (see, e.g. Jen, Choi, and Lee, 1997, Lewis et al., 1999 and 
2003, Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 2005a, and Chang et al., 2004); 
 aggregate volume of issues in the market (e.g. Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 
2005b, and Lewis et al., 2003); 




By adjusting the parameters of the issue (maturity, conversion price, callability, etc.) 
issuers can structure the convertible to be either more straight debt-like or more equity-
like. More debt-like convertibles will have higher conversion prices (and consequently 
higher conversion premiums) and/or shorter maturities than more equity-like bonds, all 
else being equal. By classifying convertible issues into more debt- or equity-like as 
captured by the delta measure (see Section 3.3), we will test the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The market valuation effect will be more negative for equity-like 
convertibles than for debt-like convertibles. 
 
The effect of issuer characteristics on the size of the wealth effect associated with the 
announcements of convertible debt offerings can, in general, be separated according to 
the dominating nature of the convertible issue (debt- versus equity-likeness) and related 
to the motives for issuing such security. Convertible debt is a particularly useful 
financing instrument in cases where informational asymmetries and market 
imperfections make the use of straight debt or equity more costly or even impossible. 
 
As Brennan and Schwartz (1988) and Brennan and Kraus (1987) show, convertible debt 
mitigates problems associated with the risk estimation of value and returns of assets  
already in place. According to these explanations, convertible debt represents an 
alternative to straight debt, which would be very costly and/or difficult to issue. Green 
(1984) also considers convertible debt as a resolution to the agency conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders, where shareholders may be inclined to expropriate debt-
holders by substituting less risky investment policies for riskier ones due to their limited 
liability in a standard debt contract. Since convertible debt can be turned into equity at 
the discretion of bondholders, it alleviates the risk shifting problem and can therefore be 
viewed as a substitute for straight debt.  
 
When treated as a substitute for straight debt, the information signalling model of Ross 
(1977) suggests that the issuance of debt securities conveys favourable information to 
the market. A manager of a successful firm may choose to increase the leverage to send 
positive signals to the market about the future performance of the firm4; unsuccessful 
firms cannot mimic these signals because they have insufficient earnings to meet the 
                                                 
4 Here, it is assumed that manager’s compensation policy includes a penalty in cases of bankruptcy, which 
makes the signal costly for the sender (manager). In reality this is usually the case, as managers lose their 
position when companies experience financial distress. 
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debt payments. On the other hand, Myers (1977) demonstrates the opposite – firms with 
higher share growth opportunities with respect to the current value of the firm issue less 
debt. In the spirit of Myers, increases in leverage can be interpreted as a worse signal 
about future growth opportunities of the company. 
 
From the debt perspective, the effect of convertible debt issuance on leverage is not 
obvious since it has both debt-like and equity-like components, if we analyze the entire 
sample of convertible issues. However, for more debt-like convertibles, the level of debt-
related costs at the firm level should have a negative impact on the price response. 
Firms are expected to face high debt-related costs when their financial leverage is high 
and earnings are not sufficiently adequate to service the interest payments, since these 
factors increase the risk of financial distress and the threat of bankruptcy. With respect 
to debt-related costs we test the following two hypotheses, where we take leverage and 
the Times-Interest-Earned (interest coverage) ratio as proxy measures for the level of 
debt and the risk of financial distress. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Higher financial leverage negatively affects the market 
valuation, in particular for more debt-like convertibles. 
Hypothesis 3b: Interest coverage positively affects the market valuation. 
 
From the equity component perspective, Kim (1990) and Stein (1992) argue that 
convertibles are delayed equity and are used to signal the quality of the firm in the 
framework of informational asymmetry. This is consistent with the adverse selection 
model of Myers and Majluf (1984), where conventional equity issues are unattractive due 
to high issue costs and dilution. Kim demonstrates that the conversion ratio serves as a 
credible signal of a company’s future earnings. Stein argues that good quality firms issue 
debt, while medium quality firms differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by 
issuing convertibles. 
 
If the nature of a convertible issue is more equity-like, the equity-related adverse 
selection costs should negatively affect the price reaction to convertible debt offerings. 
Lucas and McDonald (1990) show why equity issues on average are preceded by positive 
abnormal returns. However, in line with the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf 
(1984), costs associated with issuing equity should be higher for companies with larger 




Hypothesis 4a: A period of positive abnormal returns preceding the 
announcement date negatively affects the market valuation. 
 
Another aspect of the issuer’s characteristics is related to the equity-like nature of 
convertibles: the free cash flow. Jensen (1986) points to the adverse effect of free cash 
flow on the value for shareholders, in particular in low growth firms. He proposes debt to 
be a better control or bonding device for managers than payout policy, as company’s 
future payouts can be changed, while debt has to be repaid. Nevertheless, it has been 
documented that reductions in dividends lead to negative wealth effects for 
shareholders, and managers try to avoid negative changes in payout policy. This is 
especially the case if their compensation schemes are related to shareholder value 
creation. Therefore payout policy has a disciplining function for managers to act in 
shareholders’ best interests. We therefore test the following two hypotheses with respect 
to the agency cost of free cash flow (agency cost of equity). 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Higher free cash flow negatively affects the market valuation. 
Hypothesis 4c: Dividends payments positively affect the market valuation. 
 
Jalan and Barone-Adesi (1995) consider convertibles as delayed equity financing, and 
motivate their use with the different tax treatment of coupon interest and dividend 
payments in a setting with market frictions and incompleteness. In such a setting, 
issuing convertibles increases the residual equity value of the firm, since the firm 
benefits from the tax shield as opposed to up-front equity financing. The cooperative 
game, and the fact that firms have repeated need for the financial markets, assure that 
both firms and investors have an incentive to use convertibles and share their benefits. 
Compared to straight debt, convertibles offer much less trade-off between interest tax 
shields and cost of financial distress. In the case of straight bonds, higher interest tax 
shields are only achievable through higher indebtedness, which increases the probability 
of financial distress. On the other hand, convertibles offer the benefit of interest tax 
shields. However, they give a smaller probability of financial distress.5 We expect a 
positive effect of the tax burden (marginal tax rate) on the size of abnormal returns, 
                                                 
5 A direct test of this tax motivated argument for the issue of convertible debt is also related to calls of 
convertibles, which we will not address in this paper. 
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especially in the case of more equity-like convertibles, implying some evidence on the tax 
motive argument. We therefore also test the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Income taxes positively affect the market valuation, in particular 
for more equity-like convertibles. 
  
From the reasoning so far it follows that price reactions to convertible debt 
announcements should be negatively influenced by both debt- and equity-related agency 
costs, since convertible debt encompasses both debt-like and equity-like components. We 
consider three additional factors that influence both debt- and equity-related costs. 
 
First, both debt-related costs (e.g. risk uncertainty and financial distress costs) and 
equity-related adverse selection costs should be lower for larger companies. Larger firms 
tend to be more familiar to the market, lowering its respective issuing costs because less 
information search and processing costs are required. On the other hand, the size of the 
company increases the complexity and analysis, so that the larger company might 
actually be more opaque. Size, therefore, does not necessarily translate into a smaller 
adverse selection problem. We therefore use the size of the firm as a control variable, but 
do not have any a priori expectation about the direction of the effect. The size of the 
company captures complex interactions between different issuer characteristics.  
 
Secondly, De Jong and Veld (2001) argue that the problem of perceived overvaluation 
will be worse for firms with sufficient slack in the form of liquid assets. The reason for 
this is that slack provides an alternative source for financing of new projects and thus 
enhances the potential agency problem (overinvestment) between managers and 
shareholders. This negative impact should be more pronounced for equity-like 
convertibles. It is not likely to be detected in the overall sample of convertibles, since its 
role should be less strong for more debt-like convertibles. However, there is also the 
opposite potential impact of slack. It can be viewed as a build up of internally generated 
and needed funds for increased capital expenditures, when the external sources of 
financing are very costly. This is in particular the case for companies with higher risk 
and larger growth opportunities (more equity-like issuers). We therefore include slack in 
our cross-sectional analysis without hypothesizing its overall effect on the valuation, since 
it does not only have a negative effect of increased agency cost of equity, but also a 
positive effect of internal (less expensive) build-up of funds. In addition, slack can also be 
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viewed as collateral, in which case it should have a positive effect on valuation in case of 
debt-like convertibles, where it mitigates agency costs of debt. 
Thirdly, a firm with good growth opportunities should face reduced debt- and equity-
related agency costs. De Jong and Veld (2001) argue that expectations in the market 
regarding the profitability of the firm’s projects reduce the potential for both the asset 
substitution problems and adverse selection problems described earlier. We therefore 
expect that the following hypothesis should hold.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Better growth opportunities of the firm positively affect the 
market valuation. 
 
Finally, we investigate the effect of the stated use of the proceeds. In the offering 
prospectuses, firms state the purposes for which the proceeds will be used, such as 
financing acquisitions, refinancing debt, capital and general expenditures. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Sample selection 
 
The sample consists of convertibles issued between January 1991 and December 2004 by 
Canadian companies that were listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. During that period 
there were 207 convertible bond issues in total. We excluded issues made by financial 
companies (SIC division H – Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), and were left with 149 
issues by non-financial companies. Data on announcement dates and other features of 
the convertible bond issues were obtained from the SDC database and checked against 
press releases in Lexis-Nexis, Canadian newswires, company web sites and the SEDAR6 
database. For 26 issues in our final sample, we have found discrepancies in the 
announcements dates. In those cases we used the earliest announcement date that we 
could find. The criteria for an issue to be included in our sample were: 
 The announcement date had to be verifiable through a source other than SDC. 
 The issuing firm’s stock price data had to be available in DataStream. 
 The issuing firm’s accounting data had to be available in DataStream. 
                                                 
6 The SEDAR stands for “System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval” and is a service of CSA 
(Canadian Securities Administration) providing public securities filings. (http://www.sedar.com/) 
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 The announcement should not confound with other corporate announcements. 
 The conversion option relates to the equity of the issuing company (no 
exchangeable bonds)7. 
 The issues of the same issuer had to be at least 120 trading days apart in order 
for the estimation and even periods for different issuers not to overlap. 
 
Given the criteria, the initial 149 issues by non-financial companies first shrink to 129 
due to stock price data availability, and further down to 107 issues due to accounting 
data availability. Of those 107 issues, we could not verify the announcement date for 10 
of them; 4 were exchangeable bonds or their conversion price relates to other than the 
underlying equity; 3 were too close together with the previous issues of the same issuer, 
causing the overlap; and 4 were joined together with the issues (by the same issuer) 
announced on the same or the previous day. This means that our final sample consists of 
86 bond issues offered by 77 different companies. The breakdown of issues over the years 
is shown in Table 1. 
 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
 
From Table 1 it appears that 60 percent of the issues in our sample were offered after 
the end of 2000. This is approximately comparable with the issue year breakdown of all 
the non-financial companies’ issues (136 of them) in the period, with somewhat better 
coverage in the sample towards the end of the sample period due to scarce data 
availability for the beginning of the 1990s. Offerings seem to exhibit some bunching, 
with hot periods being 1993-1994 and the end of the 1990s onwards. 
 
3.2. Event study methodology 
 
The announcement effects of the convertible bonds are estimated using an event study 
methodology as described in e.g. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). For the market 
portfolio use the Standard & Poor’s TSX (Toronto Stock Exchange) value-weighted price 
index, which is widely considered as the benchmark for Canadian equities. It accounts 
for more than 200 stocks listed on the TSX or about 70% of the total market 
                                                 
7 An exchangeable bond may be converted into existing shares of the same or an alternative company. It is much 
like a convertible, except that in a convertible the bond may be converted into new shares. 
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capitalization. Denoting the announcement period, reported by SDC, as day 0, the 
estimation period ranges from day -120 to day -20.  
3.3. Proxies 
 
The variables that are used in the analysis are related to the hypotheses described in 
Section 2. 
 
Leverage. Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio between total debt and total assets. 
Times-Interest-Earned. The Times-Interest-Earned ratio (TIE) is a measure that is often 
employed in practice, in particular in restrictive covenants that govern typical debt 
contracts. It is defined as EBIT (Earnings Before Income and Taxes) over interest 
expense. Slack. SLACK is measured as the ratio of cash and equivalents over total 
assets. Free cash flow. Free cash flow (FCFA) is measured as the ratio of free cash flow 
(net income plus depreciation minus capital expenditures) over total assets. Dividend 
payout. The dividend payout (PAYDUM) is measured using a dummy variable with 
value 1 if the company paid cash dividends in the previous year and value 0 otherwise. 
Tax burden. The tax burden (TAXDUM) is also measured using a dummy variable. This 
variable has value 1 if the company paid income taxes in the previous year and value 0 
otherwise. Growth opportunities. Growth opportunities are measured using Tobin’s Q 
(Q). This ratio is computed as the sum of market value of equity (measured as the 
average between (-15,-5) days relative to the announcement date), long term and short 
term debt. This is divided by the book value of total assets to obtain the market-to-book 
ratio as the proxy for the growth opportunities. Size of the firm. We have added a control 
variable for firm size, i.e. the natural logarithm of firm size (LNTA). 
 
The size of the equity component of convertible debt. The most difficult variable to proxy 
is the equity component of convertible debt. As previously shown and used in the 
literature (see, e.g., Burlacu, 2000), different approaches can be used to determine the 
size of the equity component embedded in a convertible bond design. Following Burlacu, 
(2000), Lewis et al. (2003), and Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2005a), we estimate the 
structure of the convertible debt design (i.e. how debt- or equity-like it is) by employing 
the delta measure. The delta is derived from the option pricing model of Black and 





















Where S is the current price of the underlying stock, K is the conversion price, δ is the 
continuously compounded dividend yield, r is the continuously compounded yield on a 
selected “risk-free” bond, σ  is the annualized stock return volatility, T is the initial 
maturity of the bond and N(.) is cumulative normal probability distribution. The delta 
measure always takes value between 0 and 1. Values closer to 1 indicate a high 
sensitivity of the convertible bond value to changes in the underlying equity (stock) 
value, implying a high probability of conversion. As a proxy for the risk-free rate we use 
the yield of a Canadian government benchmark bond of the closest matching maturity 
rounded upwards. For the stock price volatility measure we use the annualized volatility 
of stock returns as estimated over the period (-120,-20) relative to the announcement 
date of the offering. 
 
In order to differentiate between equity- and debt-like convertibles we use a delta cut-off 
value of 0.5. We will denote the sub-sample with a delta smaller than 0.5 as more debt-
like, while the sub-sample with a delta greater than (or equal) 0.5 will be referred to as 
the more equity-like sample. For comparison, Burlacu (2000) denotes convertibles with 
delta values below 0.33 as debt-like and those with delta values above 0.66 as equity- 
like. Lewis et al. (2003) use cut-off values for delta of 0.4 and 0.6 for classifying bonds as 
either debt or equity-like. Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2005a) use the median delta 
value as a split for this classification. 
 
As an alternative measure of the size of the equity component in convertible debt, we use 
the ratio of equity to straight debt component value of convertible bond (ED). Values of 
equity and debt components are estimated using the convertible debt valuation approach 
proposed by Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998). We estimate the model price of the 
convertible bond at the issue, where the price is the sum of equity (value of the 
conversion right) and straight debt component. We use values of ED greater than 1 as 
the reference for the more equity-like convertibles, and values of ED lower than 1 as the 
reference for the more debt-like convertibles. 
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Wealth effects associated with the announcement dates of convertible 
debt offerings 
 
In Table 2 we present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAAR) and tests for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the wealth effects associated with the announcements of 
the convertible debt offerings. 
 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
 
In Panel A of Table 2 the results for the total sample are presented. CAARs are 
significantly negative over different event windows for the total sample. In particular, 
the size of the effect for the event window (-1,1) is a significantly negative 2.7%. These 
results are in line with the results from previous studies, in particular those for the U.S. 
market. Panels B and C of Table 2 report the CAAR for the sub-samples with a value of 
the delta measure above 0.5 and below 0.5 respectively. The first interesting result is the 
comparison of wealth effects for the sub-samples in the event window (-10, -2), where the 
CAAR of 2.24% is significantly positive for more equity-like convertibles (delta above 
0.5), and significantly negative (-0.77%) for the more debt-like convertibles (delta below 
0.5). The difference between the two values is also significant. This implies that prior to 
the announcement of the issue, more equity-like issuers experience a significant stock 
price run-up. This suggests that issuers try to time their announcements after periods of 
favorable stock price movements. It also suggests that the market is more likely to 
perceive the more equity-like issuers as overvalued at the announcement dates of the 
convertible debt offerings in our sample, given the prior streak of positive abnormal 
returns. Therefore they react more negatively to the announcement. The most negative 
CAAR for the more equity-like issuers are in the event window (0,20) with significantly 
negative 6.32%, while more debt-like issuers do not experience significant wealth effects 
during that period. Based on the results in Table 2 we conclude the following with 
respect to the hypotheses.8 Firstly, the market responds negatively to the 
                                                 
8 The findings in Table 2 are confirmed using non-parametric test results. The Wilcoxon signed rank test, which 
tests the difference in sums of ranks of the mean adjusted CAAR above and below medium, gives significant 
differences. These differences are statistically significant for different event windows (up to 20 trading days) 
following the announcement date. A similar result, using the difference in means between Panels B and C in 
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announcements of convertible debt offerings, which confirms Hypothesis 1. Secondly, the 
wealth effects are significantly more negative for the more equity-like convertible issues 
than for the more debt-like issues. This confirms Hypothesis 2.  
 
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the CAARs over the event window (-20, 50) for the total 
sample as well as for the two sub-samples with a delta measure above or below 0.5. A 
striking result is that the wealth effect continues to grow negatively after the 
announcement date. For the total sample, we find a CAAR of -1.35% at the 
announcement of the issue, while over the event window (-1,2) the CAAR drops to -2.87% 
and continues to fall to -4.62% over the event window (0,20). From the analysis of the 
two sub-samples it appears that the more debt-like convertible issues (delta below 0.5) 
experience negative abnormal returns somewhat prior to the announcement, i.e. -0.77% 
over the event window (-10,-2), and this rebounds after the announcement of the offering 
to around 0. Conversely, the more equity-like convertible issues (delta above 0.5) exhibit 
a significantly positive abnormal return reaction prior to the issue announcement (2.24% 
in the event window -10,-2), but this becomes significantly negative after the 
announcement by decreasing to around -4% over the event window (-1,2) and even 
further to -6.32% over the event window (0,20).  
 
4.2. Inspection of Issue and issuer characteristics 
 
In order to explore the characteristics of the issues and the issuing companies we 
examine some descriptive statistics for the total sample and the two sub-samples 
according to the delta measure. Selected descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. 
 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
 
From Table 3 it appears that the more debt-like convertible issues (Panel B) have 
significantly lower conversion premiums (ratio between conversion price and stock price 
at the announcement date of the issue) and shorter maturities than more equity-like 
convertibles (Panel C), i.e. a conversion premium of 1.153 versus 1.290, and a maturity 
                                                                                                                                                        
Table 2 is obtained using the non-parametric Kruskall-Wallis test for the equality of subpopulations. These 
results are available on request from the authors. 
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of 6.4 years versus 9.9 years. A significantly lower conversion premium for the more 
debt-like convertibles is surprising. Typically, a conversion premium for the more debt-
like convertibles should be higher than for the equity-like convertible, since the 
probability of conversion should be lower. This is correctly reflected in significantly lower 
maturity and also in the lower volatility (0.21 for more debt-like convertibles versus 0.48 
for more equity-like). This can be explained in terms of time varying elements 
(conversion price, maturity, volatility, dividend yield) that affect the value of delta 
measure. Most of the debt-like issues in our sample occurred towards the end of our 
sample period, while the opposite is true for more equity-like issues. 
 
As already shown in the previous section, issuers of the more equity-like convertibles 
experience significantly positively abnormal returns prior to the announcement of the 
issue, while those of more debt-like convertibles experience significantly negatively 
CAAR. The same conclusion can be inferred from Table 3, as the stock price run-up over 
the period (-10,-2) days prior to the announcement is significantly larger by 3 percentage 
points for the more equity-like issuers. 
 
Both types of issuers seem to have similar leverage on average (0.236 for the more 
equity-like versus 0.218 for the more debt-like). The difference between interest coverage 
capacity is not significant, although the Times-Interest-Earned ratio is on average 
higher for the more debt-like convertibles by around 0.8. 
There is no statistically significant difference between the Q-ratios of the equity-like and 
the debt-like issues. The equity-like issues do seem to be accompanied by more risk, as 
indicated by a higher volatility of respectively 48% versus 21% (annually). Note that 
issuers of equity-like convertibles are characterized as those that might have wanted to 
issue equity, but due to adverse selection and agency problems this would have been too 
costly or impossible.  
 
The level of slack is significantly higher for the equity-like convertibles (8.5% of the total 
assets versus 2.4% of the total assets for debt-like issuers). The dividend payout policy is 
also significantly different between the issuers of the more equity-like and those of more 
debt-like convertibles. While 86% of issuers of the more debt-like convertibles pay 
dividends, only 47% of issuers of the more equity-like convertibles do so. The ratio 
between capital expenditures and depreciation is on average significantly by twofold 
higher for more equity-like convertible issuers than more debt-like issuers. The ratio of 
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2.88 for the more equity-like issuers suggests that they, on average, invest in capital 
assets almost three times the value of depreciation in a given year. This ratio is below 1 
(0.93) for the more debt-like convertible issuers, which means that their capital 
investments fall short to replace the depreciated assets. This may also be the reason why 
almost half (11 out of 24) of the more debt-like issuers use the proceeds for mergers and 
acquisitions – i.e. grow by acquisitions. In case of equity-like convertible issuers, only 7 
out of 62 issuers use the proceeds for acquisitions. More equity-like issuers also have, on 
average, negative free cash flow relative to the total assets (-6.9% of the total assets), 
while the free cash flow for the more debt-like issuers is, on average, positive (1.6% of 
the total assets). This implies that, given the costly external finance, more equity-like 
issuers are more financially constrained than more debt-like convertible bond issuers. 
 
Overall, the more equity-like convertible issuers seem to have slightly better growth 
opportunities, are riskier, are less likely to pay dividends, invest relatively more, and are 
more financially constrained than the more debt-like convertible issuers. This is in line 
with many previous findings (see for example Lewis et al., 1999; Jen et al., 1997) on the 
characteristics of convertible debt issuers. 
 
4.3.  Cross sectional analysis of determinants of the size of the wealth effect 
 
In order to examine the impact on the size of the wealth effect due to the implicit design 
of convertibles (e.g. delta) and the issuer characteristics associated with debt- and 
equity-related agency costs, we perform a number of cross sectional regressions. In all 
the models we consider, the dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal 
return in the event window (-1,1). 
 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
 
In the first specification, we test our hypotheses regarding the effects of debt-related 
agency costs (Hypotheses 3a and 3b), equity-related agency costs (Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c), 
the effect of tax burden (Hypothesis 5) and the mitigating effect of growth opportunities 




Based on the results of the first regression specification in Table 49, we do not find 
support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. The proxy for leverage (LEV) gives the expected 
positive sign, but it is insignificant. The proxy for Times-Interest-Earned (TIE) gives an 
unexpected negative sign, but this is also insignificant. Hypothesis 4a is confirmed, 
because we see that the market valuation is worse after a period of significant stock 
price run-up (a significantly negative coefficient of -0.332). This implies that an increase 
in cumulative abnormal stock returns in the event window (-10,-2) of 3 percent decreases 
the announcement related CAAR by 1 percentage point. This confirms the hypothesis 
that investors are more concerned with overvaluation when the announcement of the 
issue is preceded by a streak of positive abnormal stock returns. Next, we find that the 
level of slack significantly positively affects CAAR. The coefficient of 0.167 implies that 
an increase in slack of 10 percentage points increases the CAAR related to the 
announcement of the issue by 1.7 percent. As mentioned earlier, this result suggests that 
slack can be viewed as a build-up of internally generated funds. These are in particular 
important when the external sources of financing are very costly. Judging by our results, 
this effect dominates the effect of the high agency costs of slack capital. We expected the 
market valuation effect to be less favorable when the issuing firm has more free cash 
flow (Hypothesis 4b). However, even though we find the expected negative sign for the 
coefficient, it is not significant. Therefore, we have to reject this hypothesis. The 
coefficient for the payout dummy variable is significantly positive 0.035. This implies 
that companies that pay dividends may expect to have, on average, a positive effect on 
the CAAR at the announcement of convertible debt offering of around 3.5 percent 
compared to the non-dividend paying companies, all else being equal. This confirms 
Hypothesis 4c and is in line with the disciplining role of the payout policy. On the other 
hand, it could also account for the fact that dividend paying companies are usually 
mature and less risky companies. The more direct effect of the disciplining role of 
dividend payments needs to be explored on the subset of more equity-like convertible 
debt issuers, where the agency costs of equity are assumed to be more important. The 
coefficient for growth opportunities (Q) was hypothesized to be positive, but it is 
insignificantly negative. Therefore we can not confirm Hypothesis 6.            
 
In the second specification in Table 4, we additionally include a tax dummy variable in 
the cross sectional regression to test for the effect of income taxes on the wealth effect. 
                                                 
9 Note that the number of observations is less than 86 (initial sample) due to missing accounting items or 
delta measures for some issues. 
18 
 
While other coefficients remain practically unchanged, we find no significant effect of 
taxes on the wealth effect associated with the announcement of the convertible debt 
offering. We therefore find no support for Hypothesis 5.  
 
Note that such an analysis for the total sample is not the most appropriate, since the 
design of the convertible has to be taken into account as we argued in Section 2.2. We 
therefore also estimate the third specification in Table 4, where we include a control 
variable for implicit issue characteristics by adding the delta measure as an explanatory 
variable. The delta measure reflects how debt- or equity-like the convertible issue is, and 
therefore it captures the issue characteristics comprehensively. Since a value of delta 
closer to 1 indicates a more equity-like convertible issue, we expect to find a negative 
relationship between the size of the wealth effect and the value of delta.  The results of 
the third specification in Table 4 are very similar to those in specifications 1 and 2. The 
effect of delta on CAAR is negative, but it is not significant. The overall results suggest 
that perceived overvaluation, slack and payout policy significantly affect the size of the 
wealth effect. This is, however, due to the fact that most of the issues in our sample are 
more equity- than debt-like. In order to test hypotheses related to impact of debt-related 
and equity-related costs on the size of wealth effects, we estimate the regressions 
separately for two sub-samples split according to implicit issue characteristics (delta). 
 
< Insert Table 5 here > 
 
In Panel A of Table 5 we present the estimation results of these two specifications, 
without dummies for the proceeds, for the two sub-samples split by the cut-off value of 
0.5 for the delta measure. Note that convertible issues with a value of delta below 0.5 are 
denoted as more debt-like, while those with a value of delta above 0.5 as more equity-
like. We expect that debt-related costs will have a significant impact for more debt-like 
convertibles, and equity-related costs will have a significant impact for more equity-like 
convertibles. As the results of specifications 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 5 show, the 
leverage has a positive sign for the convertible with the value of delta below 0.33 and a 
negative sign for those with the value of delta below 0.5. However, the coefficients are 
insignificant. This means that, just like in Table 4, we don’t find a confirmation for 
Hypothesis 3a. The interest coverage has a significantly positive effect on CAAR in the 
both cases (columns 1 and 2) of more debt-like convertible bond issues. This can be 
interpreted as a confirmation of Hypothesis 3b. The economic significance of the effect of 
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interest coverage seems to be rather small, but given the very high variation in the TIE-
ratio (between around -2 to around 40 for debt-like convertible issues), the coefficient of 
around 0.002 suggests that increase in TIE of 5 leads to the increase in CAAR of around 
1 percent, all else being equal. In both sub-samples of debt-like convertibles, growth 
opportunities have a significantly negative effect on CAAR (coefficient of between -0.05 
and –0.04), where an increase in the Q-ratio of 0.25 leads to approximately 1 percent 
decrease in CAAR. This can be interpreted as a rejection of Hypothesis 6. Company size 
also has a significantly negative effect on CAAR. Although the negative effect of growth 
opportunities seems somewhat surprising, one can also think of the Q-ratio as a proxy 
for the risk of the company. As stated earlier, firm size might not only mitigate adverse 
selection and agency problems, but could actually make them more acute since the 
opaqueness increases with the size. This might lead to difficulties in risk estimation such 
that larger issuers with higher growth opportunities (in the universe of more debt-like 
convertible issues) are perceived to be riskier. This negative effect on CAAR is mitigated 
with better interest ratio coverage and higher slack (positive impact of slack on 
valuation is marginally significant in regression (1)). As mentioned earlier, one might 
think of a slack as having a role of collateral. For instance, an increase of slack 
(coefficient of 0.213) relative to the total assets of 5 percentage points leads to 
approximately 1 percentage point increase in CAAR. To sum up, we find support for one 
of the hypotheses relating to the effect of debt-related agency costs on the wealth effects 
associated with the announcement of convertible debt offerings for the sub-sample of 
debt-like convertibles, while equity-related agency costs do not adversely affect the 
valuation in this case. We do not find any significant effect of tax burden on the 
valuation (Hypothesis 5). 
 
The specifications 3 and 4 in Panel A of Table 5 relate to the sub-samples of more equity-
like convertible bond issues. Here, we find that proxies relating to the agency cost of 
equity significantly affect the wealth effects at the announcement of convertible debt 
issues. More specifically, the prior stock price run-up negatively affects the valuation, as 
there is more concern about the potential overvaluation of the equity. As in Table 4, this 
result can be interpreted as a confirmation of Hypothesis 4a. The coefficients for SPRUN 
of -0.32 (delta<0.5) and -0.39 in the case of convertibles with the value of delta being 
higher than 0.67 suggest that a 5 percent positive cumulative average abnormal return 
in a ten day period prior to the announcement of the issue leads to negative 1.5 to 2 
percent CAAR following the announcement. This is mitigated by the dividend payout 
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policy (coefficient of 0.34 for PAYDUM), where equity-like convertible debt issuers that 
pay dividends on average experience 3.3 percent higher CAAR than non-dividend paying 
companies, in case of convertibles with the value of delta being higher than 0.5. As in 
Table 4, this is in line with Hypothesis 4c. Similarly, in the case of convertible with value 
of delta higher than 0.67, the effect of payout policy is still positive, but becomes of less 
importance and insignificant. Here however, the effect of free cash flow becomes negative 
(coefficient of –0.113) and marginally significant. This suggests that more equity-like 
convertible issuers are, in addition, even more plagued with agency cost of equity, which 
gives some support for Hypothesis 4b. Again, as in Table 4, we find a significant positive 
effect of slack (coefficient of between 0.21 and 0.23) on the valuation. As discussed 
previously, this confirms that the overall effect of slack is positive, or, put differently, the 
flexibility benefits of such “buffer” funds in the case of costly external financing outweigh 
the agency cost of slack. For the more debt-like convertible issues in columns 1 and 2, we 
find a positive (and again not significant) effect of free cash flow. This also leads to a 
rejection of Hypothesis 4c. With respect to the tax dummy, we do not find a significant 
effect on the valuation in the case of more equity-like convertible issues, again leading to 
a rejection of Hypothesis 5. 
 
In Panel B of Table 5, we redo the sub-sample analysis for more equity-like versus more 
debt-like convertibles using the alternative measure of equity-to-debt component of 
convertible bond (ED). The results for the more equity-like convertibles (columns 3 and 
4) remain almost the same in terms of statistical and economic significance as in the case 
of sub-sample analysis based on delta measure in Panel A. The effect of free cash flow on 
the wealth effect here is marginally negatively significant (a coefficient of -0.129 in 
column 3), giving some support to Hypothesis 4b. This suggests that in the case of equity-
like convertibles, an increase in free cash flow to assets ratio of 0.1 leads to a decrease in 
CAAR of around 1.2 percentage points, all else being equal. The results for the sub-
sample of the more debt-like convertibles, as defined with the value of ED below 0.75, 
are mostly similar to those in columns 1 and 2 of Panel A (more debt-like convertibles as 
measured with delta measure), giving support to Hypothesis 3b. In addition, the 
coefficient of leverage is significantly negative (-0.14), which gives some support for 
Hypothesis 3a. The effects of stock price run-up and dividend payments are significant or 
marginally significant, but of the opposite signs as in the case of more equity-like 
convertibles. We interpret this as additional evidence to support the conjecture that 
equity-like and debt-like convertible issuers are adversely affected by different types of 
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agency costs. Summarizing, the sub-sample analysis based on an alternative measure of 
convertible security design (equity-to-debt component value) gives similar results as the 
sub-sample analysis based on the delta measure. 
 
De Jong and Veld (2001) argue that the profitability of the projects reduces the potential 
for asset substitution problems and adverse selection. In order to examine the effect of 
the stated use of the proceeds of the convertible issue on the wealth effect, we estimate a 
number of specifications where we include dummy variables for Merger & Acquisitions 
(M&A), Refinancing, and Capital Expenditure (CAPX) or General Expenditure 
(GENX)10. In Panel C of Table 5 we present the estimation results of the specifications 
with dummies for the proceeds for the total sample of convertible debt issues over the 
period 1991 - 2004. First, we do not find a significant effect of the stated use of proceeds 
on the valuation, as coefficients for all dummy variables relating to the stated use of 
proceeds are not significant. Secondly, the effect of other issuer characteristics on the 
wealth effects remains in line with the results from Table 4. We conclude that use of 
proceeds does not seem to affect the abnormal returns. 
 
Finally, in Panel D of Table 5 we present the estimation results for the two sub-samples, 
split according to the value of the Q-ratio. We have used values of 0.9, 1 and 1.1 as cut-
off points. First, the results show that stock price run-up (overvaluation concern) has a 
significant negative effect for the sub-sample of companies with better growth 
opportunities (columns 3 and 4), with coefficients of around -0.25. The dividend payout 
dummy is only significantly positive for the companies with lower Q (coefficient of 0.04). 
Interestingly, this positive effect is not significant for companies with values of Q lower 
than 0.9. However, for these companies the effect of slack becomes more important 
(coefficient 0.6235) and marginally significant, as opposed to the extended sub-sample of 
lower Q companies (column 2). This might suggest that for the companies with worse 
growth opportunities (column 1), the role of slack as collateral becomes more important 
than just relying on a disciplining role of payout policy (as in the case of lower growth 
companies with values of Q closer to 1 – column 2). The impact of leverage on the 
valuation is positive (and marginally significant) in the case of lower Q companies. This 
is to say that, in the absence of good growth opportunities, dividend payout is not a 
sufficient controlling device per se. Therefore debt serves the role of this alternative, 
more powerful, controlling device. This is in line with Jensen’s (1986) argument about 
                                                 
 If issuers stated more potential uses of proceeds, we recorded the first use stated as predominant. 10
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the relative effectiveness of payout policies versus debt as controlling device. Finally, 
slack has a positive (and marginally significant) effect on shareholders’ wealth in the 
case of higher Q companies. This goes back to the trade-off between the costs and 
benefits of slack and is consistent with results in previous tables. In Table 6 we present 
the summary of hypotheses and the results. 
 
< Insert Table 6 here > 
 
In general, our results suggest that debt- and equity-related costs negatively affect the 
size of the wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible debt 
offerings, in particular if issues are split according to its design characteristics (either 
more debt- or equity-like). We find no evidence that the use of proceeds affects the 
valuation. We show that the negative effect of a stock price run-up prior to the 
announcement, positive effect of slack, and dividend payout are consistent across 
different specifications and sample splits. We find no evidence for the tax hypothesis 
relating to the benefits of the use of convertible debt as opposed to the use of equity. 
Finally, we find that companies with lower growth opportunities benefit from the 
additional controlling device (leverage), while companies with higher growth 
opportunities benefit from higher slack, as benefits of such flexible internal funds 
relative to costly external financing seem to outweigh the agency cost of slack, in 




In this paper we analyze the size and determinants of wealth effects associated with the 
announcements of convertible debt offerings on the Canadian market in the period 
between 1991 and 2004.  
 
Similarly to previous research for other markets, in particular the U.S., we find a 
significant negative wealth effect associated with the announcement date of convertible 
debt offerings. We also find support for the hypotheses related to the negative impact of 
debt- and equity-related agency costs on the size of the wealth effect. In particular, we 
find that the determinants of the size of the wealth effects reflect the hybrid nature of 
convertible debt, where convertible debt issues can be structured to be either more debt- 
or equity-like. More specifically, we show that proxies for agency costs of equity 
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negatively affect abnormal returns associated with the issue of more equity-like 
convertibles, while they do not significantly affect wealth effects associated with the 
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Breakdown of convertible debt issues according to year of the issue. Distribution of non-
financial Canadian companies that announced a convertible bond loan in the period from 
January 1991 to December 2004 by announcement year. The announcements are identified from 
the SDC database. Announcements are eliminated for the following reasons (1) no stock and 
accounting data available; (2) non-verifiable announcement dates; (3) non-standard convertible 
bonds; (4) issuance dates overlap or are very close to issuance dates of other securities.     
Year Frequency Percent 
2004 10 17.5 
2003 13 17.5 
2002 12 14.3 
2001 6 11.1 
2000 3 4.8 
1999 7 9.5 
1998 4 3.2 
1997 4 6.3 
1996 5 1.6 
1995 2 3.2 
1994 8 11.1 
1993 5 7.9 
1992 3 3.2 
1991 4 4.8 





Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) for different event windows 
Cumulative average abnormal returns for the sample of 86 convertible bond announcements by Canadian companies from January 1991 to December 2004. The 
convertible bond announcements are identified from the SDC database. Abnormal returns are based on the market model, estimated over a 100-day period for each 
company (from day -120 to day -20).  Under the null hypothesis CAR equals 0. 
 
* - denotes significance at below 10% level, ** - denotes significance at below 5% level and *** - denotes significance at below 1% level 
 
Panel A - Total Sample Panel B - delta above 0.5 Panel C - delta below 0.5 
n=86 n=62 n=24 
Panel B - Panel C 
CAAR window 
CAAR J1 stat. CAAR J1 stat. CAAR J1 stat. difference 
-10 -2 1.426% 3.92 *** 2.240% 4.62 *** -0.769% -2.42 *** 3.009% ** 
-5 -2 0.680% 2.00 ** 0.990% 2.20 ** -0.155% -0.47   1.145%  
-2 0 -0.598% -1.25   -1.150% -1.80 ** 0.890% 2.16 ** -2.040% ** 
-1 0 -0.539% -1.45 * -0.860% -1.75 ** 0.328% 0.93   -1.187%  
-1 1 -2.703% -6.53 *** -3.669% -6.63 *** -0.098% -0.29   -3.571% *** 
-1 2 -2.874% -7.48 *** -3.995% -7.80 *** 0.145% 0.43   -4.140% *** 
-1 5 -2.871% -8.60 *** -4.000% -8.99 *** 0.171% 0.58   -4.171% *** 
0 0 -1.351% -3.74 *** -1.982% -4.37 *** 0.350% 0.67   -2.332% *** 
0 1 -3.516% -11.58 *** -4.791% -11.84 *** -0.076% -0.29   -4.715% *** 
0 2 -3.687% -12.21 *** -5.117% -12.82 *** 0.167% 0.56   -5.284% *** 
0 5 -3.684% -12.91 *** -5.122% -13.52 *** 0.193% 0.74   -5.315% *** 




Descriptive statistics for issue and issuer characteristics for total sample, 
sub-sample with delta < 0.5 and sub-sample with delta > 0.5 
Descriptive statistics for the 86 convertible bond announcements by Canadian companies from January 1991 
to December 2004. The convertible bond announcements are identified from the SDC database. The sub-
samples are divided according to the delta (below and above 0.5) of the conversion rights. DELTA is a 
measure of the sensitivity of the value of the convertible bond with respect to the value of the underlying 
equity. This measure is calculated using the option pricing model of Black and Scholes corrected for 
continuous dividend payments (see equation 8). LEV is computed as the ratio between total debt and total 
assets. TIE is the Times-Interest-Earned ratio. This is defined as EBIT (Earnings Before Income and Taxes) 
over interest expense. SLACK is the ratio of cash and equivalents over total assets. SPRUN is the 
cumulative average abnormal stock return measured over the window (-10,-2) relative to the announcement 
date. FCFA is the ratio of free cash flow (net income + depreciation – capital expenditures) over the total 
assets. PAYDUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if the company paid cash dividends in the previous year 
and value 0 otherwise. Q is a Tobin’s Q-ratio measured as (market value of equity measured as average 
between (-15,-5) days relative to the announcement date + book value of long and short term debt) over the 
book value of total assets. TAXDUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if the company paid income taxes in 
the previous year and value 0 otherwise. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets. CAPXDEP is the 
ratio between capital expenditures and depreciation. CPREM is conversion premium, defined as the ratio 
between conversion price and the stock price. VOLAT is the annualized stock returns volatility, measured 
during the period (-120, -20) relative to the announcement date of the issue.  
 
* - denotes significance at below 10% level, ** - denotes significance at below 5% level and *** - denotes significance at 
below 1% level 
 
Variable  mean min max median cv n 
Panel A: Total sample 
LEV 0.232 0.000 0.697 0.182 0.776 79 
TIE 3.859 -35.920 101.798 1.526 4.663 78 
SPRUN 0.015 -0.548 0.311 0.008 7.273 86 
SLACK 0.069 0.000 0.390 0.042 1.157 81 
FCFA -0.046 -0.540 0.149 0.001 -2.860 78 
PAYDUM 0.570 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.875 79 
Q 1.364 0.250 6.454 1.069 0.835 80 
LNTA 13.639 10.583 17.957 13.580 0.109 81 
CAPXDEP 2.385 0.000 19.809 1.277 1.620 79 
MATURITY 8.908 0.162 30.041 7.005 0.680 86 
CPREM 1.193 0.316 3.134 1.137 0.293 86 
VOLAT 0.406 0.119 1.466 0.321 0.607 86 




Table 3 – continued 
Variable  mean min max median cv n 
Panel B: Delta < 0.5 
LEV 0.218 0.000 0.490 0.199 0.610 21 
TIE 4.452 -2.223 41.621 2.004 2.244 20 
SPRUN -0.008 -0.104 0.116 -0.005 -8.184 24 
SLACK 0.024 0.000 0.165 0.000 1.790 21 
FCFA 0.016 -0.143 0.121 0.023 3.993 21 
PAYDUM 0.857 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.418 21 
Q 1.304 0.506 3.049 1.168 0.405 21 
LNTA 13.240 11.435 15.475 13.333 0.067 21 
CAPXDEP 0.931 0.002 2.878 0.902 0.933 20 
MATURITY 6.355 0.162 20.989 5.416 0.613 24 
CPREM 1.153 1.004 2.509 1.086 0.287 24 
VOLAT 0.205 0.119 0.350 0.192 0.290 24 
DELTA 0.159 0.008 0.495 0.143 0.818 24 
Panel C: Delta > 0.5 
LEV 0.236 0.000 0.697 0.178 0.823 58 
TIE 3.654 -35.920 101.798 1.173 5.500 58 
SPRUN 0.022 -0.548 0.311 0.022 5.388 62 
SLACK 0.085 0.000 0.390 0.066 0.989 60 
FCFA -0.069 -0.540 0.149 -0.017 -2.071 57 
PAYDUM 0.466 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.081 58 
Q 1.385 0.250 6.454 0.992 0.933 59 
LNTA 13.779 10.583 17.957 13.803 0.118 60 
CAPXDEP 2.878 0.000 19.809 1.484 1.509 59 
MATURITY 9.896 2.003 30.041 7.134 0.653 62 
CPREM 1.290 1.038 3.134 1.204 0.247 62 
VOLAT 0.484 0.188 1.466 0.418 0.512 62 
DELTA 0.782 0.509 0.991 0.811 0.165 62 
Panel D: Difference in means Panel C - Panel B 
LEV 0.018        
TIE -0.798      
SPRUN 0.030 **     
SLACK 0.061 ***     
FCFA -0.085 ***     
PAYDUM -0.392 ***     
Q 0.081      
LNTA 0.538 **     
CAPXDEP 1.947 ***     
MATURITY 3.541 ***     
CPREM 0.137 **     
VOLAT 0.279 ***     






Dependent variable is cumulative average abnormal return in the event window (-1,-1) around the 
convertible debt offering announcement. Cumulative average abnormal returns are for the sample of 86 
convertible bond announcements by Canadian companies from January 1991 to December 2004. The 
convertible bond announcements are identified from the SDC database. Abnormal returns are based on the 
market model, estimated over a 100-day period for each company (from day -120 to day -20). LEV is 
computed as the ratio between total debt and total assets. TIE is the Times-Interest-Earned ratio. This is 
defined as EBIT (Earnings Before Income and Taxes) over interest expense. SLACK is the ratio of cash and 
equivalents over total assets. SPRUN is the cumulative average abnormal stock return measured over the 
window (-10,-2) relative to the announcement date. FCFA is the ratio of free cash flow (net income + 
depreciation – capital expenditures) over the total assets. PAYDUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if the 
company paid cash dividends in the previous year and value 0 otherwise. Q is a Tobin’s Q-ratio measured as 
(market value of equity measured as average between (-15,-5) days relative to the announcement date + book 
value of long and short term debt) over the book value of total assets. TAXDUM is a dummy variable with 
value 1 if the company paid income taxes in the previous year and value 0 otherwise. LNTA is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. DELTA is the measure of the sensitivity of the value of convertible bond with 
respect to the value of the underlying equity. This measure is calculated using the option pricing model of 
Black and Scholes corrected for continuous dividend payments (see Equation 8). All the standard errors are 
White heteroskedasticity corrected. 
 
 
OLS regressions of the cumulative average abnormal returns in the event window (-1,-1) on the 
issue and issuer characteristics 
1 2 3 Variable 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
LEV 0.0093 0.32   0.0115 0.37   0.0100 0.32  
TIE -0.0001 -0.51   0.0000 -0.06   -0.0001 -0.42  
SLACK 0.1666 2.18 ** 0.1723 2.23 ** 0.1678 2.11 ** 
SPRUN -0.3322 -2.47 ** -0.3263 -2.40 ** -0.3386 -2.36 ** 
FCFA -0.0525 -1.21   -0.0466 -1.02   -0.0636 -1.28  
PAYDUM 0.0351 3.19 *** 0.0336 3.10 *** 0.0281 2.07 ** 
Q -0.0047 -0.82   -0.0043 -0.78   -0.0046 -0.77  
LNTA -0.0077 -1.90 * -0.0069 -1.62   -0.0063 -1.13  
TAXDUM     -0.0076 -0.55   -0.0010 -0.06  
DELTA         -0.0215 -0.81  
_CONS 0.0551 0.93   0.0472 0.77   0.0530 0.74   
N 80   80   74  
Adj.  2R 0.329   0.322   0.310  
 *** - denotes significance at below 1% level 
* - denotes significance at below 10% level 





OLS regressions of abnormal returns at the announcement date of convertible debt offering on issue and issuer characteristics for split samples 
Dependent variable is cumulative average abnormal return in the event window (-1,-1) around the convertible debt offering announcement. Cumulative average abnormal returns are for 
the sample of 86 convertible bond announcements by Canadian companies from January 1991 to December 2004. The convertible bond announcements are identified from the SDC 
database. Abnormal returns are based on the market model, estimated over a 100-day period for each company (from day -120 to day -20). LEV is computed as the ratio between total debt 
and total assets. TIE is the Times-Interest-Earned ratio. This is defined as EBIT (Earnings Before Income and Taxes) over interest expense. SLACK is the ratio of cash and equivalents over 
total assets. SPRUN is the cumulative average abnormal stock return measured over the window (-10,-2) relative to the announcement date. FCFA is the ratio of free cash flow (net income 
+ depreciation – capital expenditures) over the total assets. PAYDUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if the company paid cash dividends in the previous year and value 0 otherwise. Q is 
a Tobin’s Q-ratio measured as (market value of equity measured as average between (-15,-5) days relative to the announcement date + book value of long and short term debt) over the book 
value of total assets. TAXDUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if the company paid income taxes in the previous year and value 0 otherwise. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
DELTA is the measure of the sensitivity of the value of convertible bond with respect to the value of the underlying equity. This measure is calculated using the option pricing model of 
Black and Scholes corrected for continuous dividend payments (see Equation 8). M&ADUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if issuer stated to use the proceeds for acquisitions and 0 
otherwise. REFDUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if issuer stated to use the proceeds for refinancing and 0 otherwise. CGXDUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if issuer stated to 
use the proceeds for capital and general expenditure and 0 otherwise. All the standard errors are White heteroskedasticity corrected. 
* - denotes significance at below 10% level, ** - denotes significance at below 5% level, *** - denotes significance at below 1% level 
Panel A: Delta 
1 2 3 4 
Delta < 0.33 Delta < 0.5 Delta > 0.5 Delta > 0.67 Variable 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
LEV 0.0230 0.31   -0.0261 -0.36   0.0184 0.52   0.0186 0.46   
TIE 0.0023 2.78 ** 0.0017 2.16 ** -0.0001 -0.34   -0.0004 -1.10   
SLACK 0.2132 2.23 ** 0.1831 1.63   0.2320 2.59 ** 0.2140 2.31 ** 
SPRUN 0.0193 0.13   0.0069 0.05   -0.3165 -2.02 ** -0.3945 -2.58 ** 
FCFA 0.0852 0.84   0.1441 1.25   -0.0875 -1.40   -0.1128 -1.86 * 
PAYDUM 0.0015 0.07   -0.0053 -0.23   0.0339 2.43 ** 0.0255 1.42   
Q -0.0499 -2.48 ** -0.0418 -2.03 * -0.0051 -0.96   -0.0047 -0.72   
LNTA -0.0504 -4.71 *** -0.0398 -4.05 *** -0.0036 -0.73   -0.0067 -1.13   
TAXDUM -0.0223 -1.16   -0.0082 -0.46   0.0024 0.13   0.0173 0.97   
_CONS 0.7159 4.76 *** 0.5816 4.17 *** -0.0177 -0.23   0.0195 0.22   
N 19   20   60   48   




Panel B: Equity-to-Debt component 
1 2 3 4 
ED<0.75 ED<1 ED>1 ED>2 Variable 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
LEV -0.1407 -2.26 ** -0.0352 -0.65   0.0385 0.99   0.0621 1.14   
TIE 0.0023 3.08 ** 0.0007 0.84   -0.0001 -0.25   0.0001 0.25   
SLACK 0.3581 0.62   0.1371 2.05 * 0.2799 2.90 *** 0.2800 2.82 *** 
SPRUN 0.2797 2.35 ** -0.1489 -0.95   -0.3633 -2.33 ** -0.3965 -3.23 *** 
FCFA 0.2321 0.88   0.0487 0.54   -0.1291 -1.78 * 0.0496 0.51   
PAYDUM -0.0233 -0.54 * 0.0319 1.43   0.0328 2.43 ** 0.0452 2.79 *** 
Q -0.0154 -0.41   0.0058 0.35   -0.0039 -0.70   -0.0084 -1.61   
LNTA -0.0187 -1.46   -0.0050 -0.55   -0.0055 -1.01   -0.0030 -0.56   
TAXDUM -0.0490 -2.03 * -0.0100 -0.61   0.0071 0.32   -0.0350 -1.82 * 
_CONS 0.3164 1.52   0.0305 0.26   -0.0048 -0.06   -0.0094 -0.13   
N 18   27   54   34   
Adj.  2R 0.439   0.301   0.352   0.649   






Panel C: Use of proceeds 
1 2 3 
M&A Refinancing Capital and General exp. Variable 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
LEV 0.0102 0.38   0.0080 0.31   0.0084 0.31   
TIE -0.0001 -0.46   0.0000 -0.08   0.0000 -0.15   
SLACK 0.1728 2.22 ** 0.1719 2.18 ** 0.1769 2.33 ** 
SPRUN -0.3324 -2.59 ** -0.3291 -2.63 *** -0.3236 -2.49 ** 
FCFA -0.0369 -0.78   -0.0450 -0.95   -0.0485 -1.05   
PAYDUM 0.0287 2.16 ** 0.0334 2.96 *** 0.0324 2.69 *** 
Q -0.0042 -0.79   -0.0043 -0.80   -0.0041 -0.74   
LNTA -0.0058 -1.25   -0.0070 -1.51   -0.0066 -1.50   
TAXDUM -0.0084 -0.60   -0.0077 -0.55   -0.0081 -0.57   
M&ADUM 0.0148 1.05           
REFDUM      0.0004 0.03       
CGXDUM          -0.0065 -0.42   
_CONS 0.0330 0.51   0.0488 0.80   0.0458 0.76   
N 81   81   81   
Adj.  2R 0.339   0.332   0.334   




Table 5 - continued 
 
 
Panel D: Growth opportunities 
1 2 3 4 
Q<0.9 Q<1 Q>1 Q>1.1 Variable 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
LEV 0.1629 1.97 * 0.1214 1.71 * -0.0379 -1.50   -0.0292 -1.10   
TIE 0.0004 0.25   0.0001 0.05   -0.0001 -0.52   -0.0001 -0.50   
SLACK 0.6235 1.74 * 0.4672 1.55   0.0982 1.81 * 0.0932 1.62   
SPRUN -0.2533 -1.29   -0.2717 -1.42   -0.2474 -3.14 *** -0.2604 -3.02 *** 
FCFA 0.2162 1.14   0.1780 1.25   -0.0514 -1.10   -0.0427 -0.91   
PAYDUM 0.0294 1.09   0.0400 2.08 ** 0.0233 1.34   0.0186 0.92   
LNTA 0.0044 0.40   -0.0001 -0.01   -0.0047 -0.70   -0.0074 -1.07   
TAXDUM -0.0255 -0.83   -0.0214 -0.86   -0.0104 -0.63   -0.0026 -0.14   
_CONS -0.1656 -0.95   -0.0891 -0.61   0.0344 0.42   0.0653 0.77   
N 29   34   47   40   





Overview of hypotheses and the results of the tests of the hypotheses 
This table gives an overview of the hypotheses that we test in this paper as well as of the results of these tests. The delta-specific and ED-specific sub-
sample results are from columns (1) and (2) of Panels A and B in Table 5 for hypotheses 3a and 3b, from columns (3) and (4) for hypotheses 4a to 4c, 
and from columns (1) to (4) for hypotheses (5) and (6). 
 
 








H1: The announcement of convertible bond 
offerings by companies in Canada has a 
significant negative market valuation 
effect 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
(CAAR) Table 2  Confirmed     
H2: The market valuation effect will be 
more negative for equity-like convertibles 
than for debt-like convertibles 
Difference in CAARs between equity-like 
(delta>0.5) and debt-like (delta<0.5) 
convertibles 
Table 2 Confirmed     
Agency costs of debt 
H3a: Higher financial leverage negatively 
affects the market valuation, in particular 
for more debt-like convertibles 
Leverage (LEV): ratio between total debt and 
total assets Tables 4 and 5 Rejected Rejected Confirmed 
H3b: Interest coverage positively affects 
the market valuation 
Times-interest-earned ratio (TIE): Earnings 
Before Income and Taxes over interest 
expense on debt 






Table 6 - continued 
 








Agency costs of equity 
H4a: A period of positive abnormal returns 
preceeding the announcement date 
negatively affects the market valuation 
CAAR over the window (-10,-2) relative to the 
announcement date Tables 4 and 5 Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
H4b: A higher free cash flow negatively 
affects the market valuation 
Free cash flow (FCFA): ratio of free cash flow 
(net income + depreciation – capital 
expenditures) over total assets 
Tables 4 and 5 Rejected Confirmed Inconclusive 
H4c: Dividends payments positively affect 
the market valuation 
PAYDUM: a dummy variable with value 1 if 
the company paid cash dividends and value 0 
otherwise 
Tables 4 and 5 Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
Tax hypothesis 
H5: Income taxes positively affect the 
market valuation, in particular for more 
equity-like convertibles 
TAXDUM: a dummy variable with value 1 if 
the company paid income taxes and value 0 
otherwise 
Tables 4 and 5 Rejected Rejected Rejected 
Agency costs of debt and equity 
H6: Better growth opportunities of the firm 
positively affect the market valuation 
Growth opportunities are measured using 
Tobin’s Q (Q): (market value of equity + short 
term debt + long term debt) over total assets 
Tables 4 and 5 Rejected Rejected Rejected 
 
Figure 1 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for the total and two sub-samples over the event window (-20, 20) 
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